Recent Books

Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon. by James Harford. New York: John Wiley, 1997, 392 pp. $30.00. A brisk, readable biography of the man behind the Soviet space program by a veteran of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Harford has drawn extensively on interviews and, to a lesser extent, secondary sources, as well as Cold War-era translations of Soviet materials. Sergei Korolev, kept in the shadows by his political masters throughout his life, began his work as a victim of Stalin’s purges in a Soviet sharashka, or prison camp for scientists. His internment did not prevent him, however, from throwing the whole of his enormous energy and practical skill into the service of the Soviet state. The space race between the United States and the Soviet Union forms the core of the book, and Harford does a fine job of telling just enough about the American side to put Soviet achievements and activities in perspective. Energy, vast resources, and the creativity of Korolev and others like him did much to compensate for the absurdities of Soviet economics, but could only go so far. They beat the United States into space initially but lived to see their rivals beat them to the moon and beyond. A truly scholarly study will, no doubt, emerge in time, but this is a worthy book nonetheless.

Churchill and the Secret Service. by David Stafford. New York: Overlook Press, 1998, 400 pp. $35.00. Most of the literature on intelligence focuses on those who produce the material rather than those who use it, and the exceptions usually deal with misunderstanding, misuse, and failure in all its forms. This book, however, examines, with an unillusioned but generally admiring eye, a statesman who knew how to read intelligence reports and exploit covert operations. Stafford’s Churchill is not the ill-informed and capricious romantic of contemporary debunkers: he is, rather, a calculating, occasionally erring, but immensely shrewd and experienced politician. Nothing very new in the stories recounted here, but they are well told and solidly grounded in archival and secondary sources, and the sum total is original and enlightening.

Global Communications, International Affairs, and the Media since 1945. by Philip M. Taylor. New York: Routledge, 1997, 248 pp. $75.00 (paper, $22.99). Despite its title, this thoughtful study is
rather focused: it concentrates on the last two decades and issues of war and peace, rather than, for example, trade and commerce. Taylor demonstrates a good feel for the technology of news gathering and dissemination, the evolution of news organizations, and the political consequences of instantaneous global news. Unlike many recent American writers on this subject, he knows the history of communications well and thus avoids some facile judgments. He stakes out some important claims, as when he dismisses the notion that media coverage played a central role in America's defeat in Vietnam—a view that he regards as a poor excuse for strategic, operational, and tactical errors unrelated to how the war appeared on American television screens. At the same time, he has few kind words for the burgeoning communications industry and the vast majority of the journalists who inhabit it; remarkably enough, he praises the psychological operations community in the American military for its role in some settings.


Virtual nuclear arsenals consist of dismantled nuclear weapons, moves toward which form the central theme of this edited work. An impressive array of experts from around the world have contributed essays to the book, not all of them warmly endorsing Mazarr's enthusiasm for a scheme that would leave the current nuclear powers with heaps of bits and pieces in place of missiles and bombers on alert. The obvious problem is that of verification and the danger that a country that might cheat on its rivals and gain a terrifying edge for several weeks as technicians scrambled to rebuild their country's deterrent. One suspects that a world safe for virtual nuclear arsenals will have solved most of its other problems as well.


Pierre has been writing on this subject for many years, and he has assembled a competent group of coauthors to discuss a variety of subjects, including patterns of arms transfers, the changing economics of the arms market, the policies of suppliers and purchasers, and prospects for arms control. There are some questionable conclusions here (for example, that the former Soviet Union has "collapsed as a major arms supplier"), but the general tone is sober and realistic. The blurring of military and civilian technologies, the spread of coproduction and joint development, and the pressures on shrinking industries for more extensive sales make restraint in arms sales difficult. The editor believes that stringent arms control measures are necessary, in part because of the link between conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction—the possibility that anthrax could end up in the warhead of a cruise missile, for instance. Perhaps, but the record is not very encouraging.


Of all the challenges of the transition to